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Abstract
How evolution favors cooperation is a fundamental issue in social and eco-
nomic systems. By incorporating multiple learning mechanisms in project
selection into the threshold public goods game, we have investigated the
coupling effect of mutation and imitation on the evolution of cooperation.
Compared with the situation where there is no project selection mechanism,
the existence of project selection may suppress or promote cooperation de-
pending upon different learning mechanisms. There exists a critical ratio
between the imitators and the mutants in the population, below which co-
operation is suppressed while above which cooperation is promoted. With
the coevolutionary mechanism of individual strategies and individual prefer-
ences, a higher level of cooperation corresponds to a larger scale of projects.
A theoretical analysis indicates that, as most of the individuals are mutants,
the coevolutionary mechanism is governed by the mutation process, which
leads to a lower level of cooperation. As most of the individuals are imitators,
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the coevolutionary mechanism is governed by the coupling of the mutation
process and the imitation process, which leads to a higher level of coopera-
tion. As all the individuals are imitators, the coevolutionary mechanism is
governed by the imitation process, which leads to an intermediate level of
cooperation.
Keywords: public goods game, project selection, multiple learning
mechanisms, individual preferences
1. Introduction
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated and
selfish individuals is a fundamental and fascinating issue in economical, social
and biological systems[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. In the last two decades, based
on the models of the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift game and the public
goods game, tremendous efforts have been dedicated to the exploration of
the conditions for the occurrence of mutually beneficial interactions, among
which the mechanisms of reputation, penalization and non-participation have
been extensively investigated[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
The public goods game describes such a scenario where each individual
in a group has the opportunity to make a contribution to a common pool or
not[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. All the contributions in the common pool
are multiplied by a factor r and divided equally among all the group members
irrespective of whether an individual has contributed to the common pool or
not. Because only the cooperators bear the burden of contributions, the
replicator dynamics in such a game model is in favor of the defectors and the
cooperators eventually become extinct.
Some social and economic experiments on public goods problems have
shown that imposing fines on exploiters can facilitate cooperation[26, 27, 28].
However, other experiments have shown that, accompanied by the imple-
mentation of costly punishment, the second-order or third-order free-rider
problems emerge accordingly[29, 30, 31, 32]. These free-rider problems ul-
timately increase the costs of imposing penalties and cause the collapse of
cooperation.
Different from the frequently discussed punishment mechanisms where
the punishers have to face severe retaliations from the punished, in real
society, there exists a kind of scenario, called gain all-or-nothing activity,
where the free-rider problems may be effectively avoided[33, 34]. For exam-
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ple, moving a huge boulder in the way needs sufficient contributions from
all the group members, or else, no one has the opportunity to go through
the blocked mountain road. Predator hunting needs sufficient supporters to
form a pincer-like encirclement, or else, no one has the opportunity to have
a hearty meal. Facing a gain all-or-nothing scenario, only when there ex-
ist enough contributors will a good aim become a reality. Although similar
problems like the role of start-up costs or critical mass in the evolution of
cooperation have been discussed[35, 36], whether or not a higher level of co-
operation can be reached through an active selection of a gain all-or-nothing
scenario by the competing individuals is still an open problem[37, 38].
In the real world, people’s activities are subject to constraints to a certain
degree. For example, competing for a large project needs a certain amount
of support. The company with limited support has to take the second best,
which may lead to a decline in earnings. In such a case, the cooperation
keeps at a lower level and taking the second best becomes a last resort,
which leads to another issue about whether project selection is detrimental
to cooperation or not[39, 40].
In the present work, we incorporate project selection mechanisms into the
threshold public goods game. The effects of multiple learning mechanisms
on the evolution of cooperation have been investigated. The following are
our main findings.
(1)The project selection mechanism is not always beneficial for coopera-
tion. Compared with the situation where there is no project selection mecha-
nism, the existence of imitation mechanism is beneficial for cooperation while
the existence of mutation mechanism is detrimental to cooperation.
(2)The coupling effects of multiple learning mechanisms on the evolution
of cooperation depend upon the ratio between the imitators and the mutants
in the population. There exists a critical ratio between the imitators and the
mutants, below which cooperation is suppressed while above which coopera-
tion is promoted. A higher level of cooperation corresponds to a larger scale
of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators.
(3)A theoretical analysis indicates that a higher level of cooperation re-
sults from the optimum matching between the group size and the project
scale. The multiple learning mechanisms are more advantageous for an indi-
vidual to find the most appropriate project, which finally makes the system
reach the highest level of cooperation.
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2. The model
In the public goods game with project selection, each individual has to
decide which project he should choose and which strategy, cooperation of
defection, he should adopt.
Before the process of project selection and the process of strategy selec-
tion, each individual i firstly makes a judgement on whether the project can
be finished or not. If there are enough cooperators in the group, that is,
ncC
max
I ≥ S, in which nc is the number of cooperators in the group, C
max
I
is an individual’s maximal contribution and S is the needed contribution for
the group members to finish the task, the project can be finished. Or else, the
project can not be finished. On condition that the project can be finished, a
cooperator gets a payoff PC =
rS
n
−
S
nc
and a defector gets a payoff PD =
rS
n
,
in which r is the multiplication factor. On condition that the project can
not be finished, that is, ncC
max
I < S, a cooperator and a defector get their
payoffs PC = PD = 0.
In the process of project selection, an individual i firstly makes a decision
on whether he should modify his project or not. If his payoff Pi in the latest
step is less than the average payoff of the population P¯ , he modifies his
project. Or else, he keeps his project. There exist two kinds of individuals:
called mutant and imitator respectively. A mutant i modifies his project
S0i in the following way: he randomly chooses a new project Si within the
range of Si ∈ [S
0
i −
R
2
, S0i +
R
2
]. If Smin ≤ Si ≤ Smax, Si = Si. If Si < Smin,
Si = Smin. If Si > Smax, Si = Smax. An imitator i modifies his project S
0
i in
the following way: he firstly finds out an individual j with the highest payoff
Pj. Then he replaces his project with individual j’s project, Si = S
0
j .
In the process of strategy selection, an individual i firstly selects an indi-
vidual j randomly. If individual i’s strategy is different from individual j’s,
individual i adopts individual j’s strategy with probability ω,
ωi←j =
1
1 + e(Pi−Pj+τ)/κ
, (1)
in which Pi is individual i’s payoff, Pj is individual j’s payoff, τ = κ = 0.1
represents an occasional drift of the strategies because of the environmental
impact. Or else, individual i keeps his strategy.
At each time step, each individual firstly gets his payoff and compares
it with the average payoff of the population. If his payoff is less than the
average payoff of the population, he updates his project. Or else, he keeps
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Figure 1: The frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the group size n for the cases
where there is no project selection mechanism (circles), all the individuals are imitators
(squares), all the individuals are mutants (triangles). Other parameters are: the total
population N = 5000, an individual’s ability (maximal contribution) Cmax
I
=2, the mul-
tiplication factor r = 5, the minimum project scale Smin=1, the maximum project scale
Smax=nC
max
I
+ 1. Final results are averaged over 10 runs and 1000 time steps with 5000
relaxation time in each run.
his payoff. Secondly, each individual gets his payoff and compares it with
another randomly chosen individual’s payoff. If his strategy is different from
another individual’s strategy, he updates his strategy with probability ω. Or
else, he keeps his strategy. The distribution of the scales of the projects
selected by the mutants and the imitators and the frequencies of cooperators
and defectors evolve over time.
3. Simulation results and discussions
Figure 1 shows the frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the group
size n for different learning mechanisms in project selection. As there is
no project selection mechanism, within the range of 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, fC keeps its
maximum value of fC ∼ 1. Within the range of 4 < n ≤ 12, fC drops quickly
from fC ∼ 1 to fC ∼ 0. Within the range of n > 12, fC keeps its minimum
value of fC ∼ 0. For ξ = 0, which corresponds to the situation where all the
individuals are mutants in project selection, within the range of 2 ≤ n ≤ 4,
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Figure 2: The frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the group size n for the ratio
of imitators ξ=0 (circles), 0.5 (squares), 0.7 (diamonds), 0.9 (crosses), 0.98 (triangles).
Other parameters are: the total population N = 5000, an individual’s ability (maximal
contribution) Cmax
I
=2, the multiplication factor r = 5, the minimum project scale Smin=1,
the maximum project scale Smax=nC
max
I
+1. Final results are averaged over 10 runs and
1000 time steps with 5000 relaxation time in each run.
fC keeps its maximum value of fC ∼ 1. Within the range of 4 < n ≤ 8, fC
has a sharp drop from fC ∼ 1 to fC ∼ 0. Within the range of n > 8, fC keeps
its minimum value of fC ∼ 0. For ξ = 1, which corresponds to the situation
where all the individuals are imitators in project selection, within the range
of 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, fC keeps its maximum value of fC ∼ 1. Within the range of
4 < n ≤ 16, fC has a sharp drop from fC ∼ 1 to fC ∼ 0.38. Within the range
of n > 16, fC fluctuates around an intermediate value of fC ∼ 0.38. Such
results indicate that the learning mechanism of mutation in project selection
is detrimental to cooperation while the learning mechanism of imitation in
project selection helps the system reach an intermediate level of cooperation.
However, the widespread of cooperation is quite difficult to be reached for
the system with a single learning mechanism in project selection.
Figure 2 shows the frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the group
size n for different ratios between the imitators and the mutants in the pop-
ulation. For ξ = 0.5, which corresponds to the situation where half of the
individuals are mutants and another half of the individuals are imitators,
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Figure 3: The frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the ratio of imitators ξ for the
group size n = 10 (circles), 12 (squares), 15 (diamonds), 20 (triangles). Other parame-
ters are: the total population N = 5000, an individual’s ability (maximal contribution)
Cmax
I
=2, the multiplication factor r = 5, the minimum project scale Smin=1, the max-
imum project scale Smax=nC
max
I
+ 1. Final results are averaged over 10 runs and 1000
time steps with 5000 relaxation time in each run.
there exist two transition points n
(1)
tr ∼ 6 and n
(2)
tr ∼ 10. Within the range
of n < n
(1)
tr , an increase in ξ has no impact on fC and it keeps its maximum
value of fC ∼ 1. At the transition point n ∼ n
(1)
tr ∼ 6, fC has a sharp drop
from fC ∼ 1 to fC ∼ 0.88. Within the range of n
(1)
tr < n < n
(2)
tr , fC has a
slow increase with the rise of n. At the transition point n ∼ n
(2)
tr ∼ 10, fC
has a sharp drop from fC ∼ 0.88 to fC ∼ 0. Within the range of n > n
(2)
tr , fC
keeps its minimum value of fC ∼ 0. For a larger ξ, the changing tendency
of fC vs n is nearly the same as that for ξ = 0.5. The transition point n
(1)
tr
changes little while the transition point n
(2)
tr increases with the rise of ξ.
Figure 3 shows the frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the ratio
of imitators ξ for different n. For n = 10, within the range of 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.44,
fC keeps its minimum value of fC ∼ 0. At the transition point ξtr ∼ 0.44, fC
increases rapidly from fC ∼ 0 to fC ∼ 0.88. Within the range of 0.48 ≤ ξ < 1,
fC firstly increases slowly from fC ∼ 0.88 to fC ∼ 0.93. At the point of
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Figure 4: The time evolution of the frequency of cooperators fC , the average value of
project scales S¯, the standard deviation of project scales σs for all the population (a, d,
g), the imitators (b, e, h), the mutants (c, f, i) respectively and the ratio of imitators ξ =
0.4 (solid lines), 0.5 (dashed lines), 0.6 (dashed dotted lines). Other parameters are: the
total population N = 5000, the multiplication factor r = 5, the group size n = 12, an
individual’s ability (maximal contribution) Cmax
I
=2, the minimum project scale Smin=1,
the maximum project scale Smax=nC
max
I
+ 1.
ξ ∼ 1, fC has a sharp drop from fC ∼ 0.93 to fC ∼ 0.85. For a larger n,
the changing tendency of fC vs ξ is nearly the same as that for n = 10. An
increase in n leads to an increase in the transition point ξtr and an increase
in the maximum value of fC .
The results in fig. 2 and fig. 3 indicate that, within the range where
cooperation is quite easy to occur, the project selection mechanism has little
impact on the change of cooperation. Within the range where cooperation is
quite difficult to occur, the coexistence of mutants and imitators in project
selection can effectively promote cooperation.
In order to find out the coevolutionary mechanism between the frequen-
cies of cooperators and the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and
the imitators, in fig. 4 (a)-(i) we plot the time evolution of the frequency
of cooperators, the average value of project scales and the standard devia-
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tion of project scales for all the population, the imitators and the mutants
respectively.
Figure 4 (a) shows that, as the ratio of imitators is quite small, the
frequency of cooperators firstly has a large fluctuation around fC ∼ 0.44 and
then drops quickly from fC ∼ 0.44 to fC ∼ 0. For an intermediate ratio of
imitators, the frequency of cooperators firstly increases quickly from fC ∼ 0.5
to fC ∼ 0.95. Then, fC fluctuates and decreases continuously from fC ∼ 0.95
to fC ∼ 0.35. After that, fC drops quickly from fC ∼ 0.35 to fC ∼ 0. For a
large ratio of imitators, the frequency of cooperators firstly increases quickly
from fC ∼ 0.5 to fC ∼ 0.95. Then, fC has a subtle decrease from fC ∼ 0.95
to fC ∼ 0.88 and keeps the value of fC ∼ 0.88 with small fluctuations.
Figure 4 (b) and (c) indicate that a continuous decrease of cooperators in
fig. 4 (a) may result from the mutants and the maintenance of a higher level
of cooperation in fig. 4 (a) may result from the imitators. For ξ = 0.5, the
frequencies of cooperators firstly increase quickly from fC ∼ 0.5 to fC ∼ 0.95
for both the mutants and the imitators. Then, fC decreases from fC ∼ 0.95
to fC ∼ 0.78 for the mutants while fC changes little for the imitators. After
that, fC decreases quickly for both the the mutants and the imitators. Such
a result indicates that, as more and more mutants become defectors, the
imitators are quite difficult to maintain a higher level of cooperation and
they become defectors later on. For ξ = 0.6, the frequencies of cooperators
firstly increase quickly from fC ∼ 0.5 to fC ∼ 0.95 for both the mutants
and the imitators. After that, for the mutants, fC has a subtle decrease
from fC ∼ 0.95 to fC ∼ 0.84 and then keeps the value of fC ∼ 0.84 with
small fluctuations. For the imitators, fC keeps the value of fC ∼ 0.95 with
small fluctuations. Such results indicate that, as most of the imitators are
cooperators, the mutants are relatively easier to maintain a higher level of
cooperation.
Figure 4 (d) and (g) show that the change of fC in fig. 4 (a) is closely
related to the change of the scales of the projects selected by the population.
Within the range where fC decreases, the average value of the scales of the
projects selected by the population S¯ decreases while the standard deviation
σs of the scales of the projects selected by the population increases. A higher
level of cooperation corresponds to a larger S¯ and a smaller σs.
Comparing the results in fig. 4 (e) and (h) with the results in fig. 4 (f)
and (i), we find that the evolution of the scales of the projects selected by the
imitators are quite different from the evolution of the scales of the projects
selected by the mutants. For the imitators, the evolution of S¯ is closely
related to the evolution of fC . A higher level of cooperation corresponds to
a larger S¯. The evolution of σs is irrelevant to the evolution of cooperation,
which keeps the minimum value of σs ∼ 0 with an initial drop down. For
the mutants, the evolution of S¯ and σs lags behind the evolution of fC . For
ξ = 0.5, as fC increases S¯ still decreases with the time. As fC decreases
continuously S¯ firstly increases and then decreases with the time. A larger S¯
corresponds to a smaller σs, which indicates that the change in the average
value of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants should result from
the change in the uniformity of the project scales.
The results in fig. 4 indicate that the improvement of cooperation in
the present model should result from the coupling of the evolution of the
project scales and the evolution of the individual strategies. As the ratio of
imitators is quite small, because most of the mutants adopt the defection
strategy, the frequency of cooperators becomes so small that the best project
for the imitators should be the small scale project. Therefore, the average
scale of the projects selected by the imitators decreases and the change in the
project scales lags behind the change in the frequency of cooperators. As the
ratio of imitators is quite large, the scattering of the project scales selected
by the mutants makes it easier for the imitators to find the most appropriate
projects, which leads to a high level of cooperation for the imitators. On the
other hand, the widespread of cooperation makes the mutants with a large
project earn more, which attracts more mutants to adopt a large project and
the average scale of the project selected by the mutants increases. Therefore,
for the imitators, the scales of the projects synchronously coevolves with the
frequency of cooperators. For the mutants, the evolution of the scales of the
projects lags behind the evolution of the frequency of cooperators.
In order to find out the effects of multiple learning mechanisms on the
scales of the projects selected by the population in the final steady state, in
fig. 5 (a) and (b) we plot the average value S¯ and the standard deviation σs
of the scales of the projects selected by the population as a function of the
ratio ξ of the imitators in the population for different group size n. Figure 5
(a) shows that, for n = 10, there exists a transition point ξtr ∼ 0.45. Within
the range of 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.45, S¯ decreases linearly from S¯ ∼ 10 to S¯ ∼ 6. At the
critical point ξtr ∼ 0.45, S¯ has a sharp rise from S¯ ∼ 6 to S¯ ∼ 16. Within
the range of 0.47 ≤ ξ < 1, S¯ increases linearly from S¯ ∼ 16 to S¯ ∼ 18. At
the point ξ ∼ 1, S¯ drops from S¯ ∼ 18 to S¯ ∼ 16. For a larger n, the changing
tendency of S¯ vs ξ changes little while the critical point ξtr and the average
value S¯ increases with the rise of n. Such results indicate that, for a given
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Figure 5: (a) The average value S¯ and (b) the standard deviation σs of the scales of the
projects selected by the population as a function of the ratio ξ of the imitators in the
population for the group size n =10 (circles), 12 (squares), 15 (diamonds), 20 (triangles).
Other parameters are: the total population N = 5000, an individual’s ability (maximal
contribution) Cmax
I
=2, the multiplication factor r = 5, the minimum project scale Smin=1,
the maximum project scale Smax=nC
max
I
+1. Final results are averaged over 10 runs and
1000 time steps with 5000 relaxation time in each run.
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n, an increase in the ratio of imitators firstly leads to a decrease and then an
increase in the project scales.
Figure 5 (b) shows that, for n = 10, there exists a transition point ξtr ∼
0.45. Within the range of 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.45, σs firstly has a little increase and
then has a little decrease within the range of σs ∈ [6,6.5]. At the critical
point ξtr ∼ 0.45, S¯ drops from S¯ ∼ 6 to S¯ ∼ 3.5. Within the range of
0.45 ≤ ξ < 1, S¯ decreases continuously from S¯ ∼ 3.5 to S¯ ∼ 0. For a larger
n, the changing tendency of σs vs ξ changes little while the critical point
ξtr and the standard deviation σs increases with the rise of n. Such results
indicate that, for a given n, an increase in the ratio of imitators firstly leads
to an increase and then a decrease in the project scales.
Comparing the results in fig. 5 with the results in fig. 3, we find that the
levels of cooperation in the present model should be related to the scales of the
projects selected by the mutants and the imitators. There exists a transition
point ξtr, below which a continuous decrease in S¯ and σs corresponds to
the maintenance of the lowest level of cooperation fC ∼ 0 and above which a
continuous increase in S¯ coupled with a continuous decrease in σs corresponds
to the occurrence of a higher level of cooperation.
In order to find out the coupling effects of different learning mechanisms
on the evolution of project scales, in fig. 6 (a) and (b) we plot the distribu-
tions of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators
respectively. Figure 6 (a) and (b) show that, as there are more mutants than
imitators, all the individuals tend to invest in small projects. The scale of
the dominant project is S
Smax
∼ 0.04. Within the range of 0 ≤ ξ < 0.5, an
increase in the ratio of imitators leads to an overall decrease of the mutants
investing in various projects while an increase of the imitators investing in
small projects. As there are more imitators than mutants, all the individuals
tend to invest in large projects, which meet a Poisson-like distribution clus-
tering around S
Smax
∼ 0.68 for the mutants and a δ-like distribution clustering
around S
Smax
∼ 0.84 for the imitators. Within the range of 0.5 < ξ < 1, as
the ratio of imitators increases, the scale of the dominant project for the
mutants increases while the scale of the dominant project for the imitators
changes little. As all the individuals are imitators, they tend to invest in the
projects with the scales S ∈[0.24,0.8].
Such results indicate that, as the ratio of imitators is quite small, the
scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators are both
determined by the mutation process, which leads to the occurrence of the
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Figure 6: The distribution of the scales S
Smax
of the projects (a) selected by the mutants for
the ratio of imitators ξ=0 (circles), 0.2 (squares), 0.4(diamonds), 0.6(triangles), 0.8(stars);
(b) selected by the imitators for the ratio of imitators ξ=0.3 (circles), 0.5 (squares), 0.6(tri-
angles), 0.8(stars), 1(crosses). Other parameters are: the total population N = 5000, the
multiplication factor r = 5, an individual’s ability (maximal contribution) Cmax
I
=2, the
minimum project scale Smin=1, the maximum project scale Smax=nC
max
I
+ 1, the group
size n = 12. Final results are averaged over 10 runs and 1000 time steps with 5000
relaxation time in each run.
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situation where nearly all the individuals invest in small projects. As the
ratio of imitators is quite large, the scales of the projects selected by the
mutants and the imitators are both determined by the coupling of the muta-
tion process and the imitation process, which leads to the occurrence of the
situation where nearly all the individuals invest in large projects. As all the
individuals are imitators, the scales of the projects selected by the individu-
als are determined by the imitation process, which leads to the scattering of
the scales of the dominant projects.
Comparing the results in fig. 5 and fig. 6 with the results in fig. 3, we find
that the occurrence of a higher level of cooperation in the present model is
closely related to the occurrence of a larger dominant project. The existence
of different learning mechanisms in project selection promotes the occurrence
of a larger dominant project, and therefore a higher level of cooperation.
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. replicator dynamics of the scales of the projects selected by mutants and
imitators
Firstly, consider the case where all the individuals are mutants. The
individuals can be divided into three categories according to the scales of
the projects selected by each individual: the number of individuals with a
small project (Ns), the number of individuals with an intermediate project
(Nm) and the number of individuals with a large project (Nl). Initially,
N0s = N
0
m = N
0
l . As the frequency of cooperators is quite small, i.e. fC =
1
N
,
given a group size n, the payoff of the cooperator with a small project may
be less than 0, that is, PC =
rCI
n
− CI < 0 on condition that CI ≥ S and
r < n. The payoff of the cooperator with an intermediate or a large project
may be equal to 0, that is, PC = 0 on condition that CI < S. Therefore, the
cooperator with a small project is quite possible to update his project and
the numbers of the individuals with different projects become Ns = N
0
s − 1,
Nm = N
0
m+1, Nl = N
0
l . Given a group size n, the payoff of the defectors with
a small project may be greater than 0, that is, PD =
rCI
n
> 0 on condition
that CI ≥ S. The payoff of the defectors with an intermediate or a large
project may be equal to 0, that is, PD = 0 on condition that CI < S. The
defectors with an intermediate or a large project is quite possible to update
his project and the numbers of the individuals with different projects become
Ns = N
0
s − 1 +∆N , Nm = N
0
m + 1, Nl = N
0
l −∆N . Because there are more
defectors than cooperators in the population, fD >> fC and ∆N >> 1, the
14
updating of the projects is quite possible to result in an increase in Ns and
a decrease in Nl, which is in accordance with the simulation result in fig. 6
(a) for ξ = 0.
Secondly, consider the case where all the individuals are imitators. Ini-
tially, the scales of the projects selected by the individuals are uniformly
distributed, N0s = N
0
m = N
0
l . The ratios of cooperators in a group can be
divided into three categories: small (
ns
C
n
), intermediate (
nm
C
n
), large (
nl
C
n
). As
the ratios of cooperators
ns
C
n
,
nm
C
n
and
nl
C
n
coexist, for the cooperators, the
individual with a large project and the largest ratio of cooperators in the
group may have the highest payoff, i.e.
nlC
n
= 1 and S = nCI , the highest
payoff of cooperators is PC =
rS
n
−
S
nC
= (r − 1)CI . For the defectors, the
individual with a large project and the second largest ratio of cooperators in
the group may have the highest payoff, i.e.
nlC
n
= n−1
n
and S = (n − 1)CI ,
the highest payoff of defectors is PD =
rS
n
= r(n−1)CI
n
. With the imitation
learning mechanism, all the individuals will adopt a large project. As the
ratios of cooperators
ns
C
n
and
nm
C
n
coexist and
nl
C
n
= 0, for both the cooper-
ators and the defectors, the individuals with an intermediate project may
have the highest payoff, i.e.
nmC
n
= 1
2
+ 1
n
and S = (n
2
+ 1)CI for a cooperator
and
nmC
n
= 1
2
and S = nCI
2
for a defector, the highest payoff of cooperators
is PC =
rS
n
−
S
nC
= ( r
2
+ r
n
− 1)CI and the highest payoff of defectors is
PD =
rS
n
= rCI
2
. With the imitation learning mechanism, all the individuals
will adopt an intermediate project. As only the ratio of cooperators
nsC
n
ex-
ists and
nmC
n
=
nlC
n
= 0, only the defector with a small project may have the
highest payoff, i.e.
nsC
n
= 1
n
and S = CI , the highest payoff of defectors is
PD =
rS
n
= rCI
n
. With the imitation learning mechanism, all the individuals
will adopt a small project. For the initial condition fC ∼ 0.5, it is quite
possible that
ns
C
n
and
nm
C
n
coexist or
ns
C
n
,
nm
C
n
and
nl
C
n
coexist. Therefore, the
system may evolve to the state where the individuals adopt an intermediate
project or a large project, which is in accordance with the simulation results
in fig. 6 (b) for ξ = 1.
Finally, consider the case where the mutants and the imitators coexist.
For a small ξ, which corresponds to the situation where most of the indi-
viduals are mutants, the replicator dynamics of the scales of the projects
selected by the mutants is similar to the situation where all the individuals
are mutants while the replicator dynamics of the scales of the projects se-
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lected by the imitators is similar to the situation where all the individuals are
imitators and only
nsC
n
exists. In such a case, most of the individuals tend to
adopt small projects. For a large ξ, which corresponds to the situation where
most of the individuals are imitators, the replicator dynamics of the scales
of the projects selected by the imitators is similar to the situation where
ns
C
n
,
nm
C
n
and
nl
C
n
coexist. For the mutants, because there are a large number
of cooperators in the population, the individuals with a large project may
have a higher payoff than the individuals with a small project. Therefore,
the number of individuals with a large project increases while the number
of individuals with a small or an intermediate project decreases, which is in
accordance with the simulation results in fig. 6 (a) and (b) for ξ = 0.8.
4.2. equilibrium between the frequencies of cooperators and the scales of the
projects selected by the population
Suppose that the system has evolved to the equilibrium state where the
cooperators and the defectors coexist. For a given group size n, the averaged
payoff of cooperators is P¯C =
rS¯C
n
−
S¯C
nfC
and the averaged payoff of defectors
is P¯D =
rS¯D
n
. In the equilibrium state, the averaged payoffs of cooperators
and defectors should be satisfied with the equation P¯C = P¯D, that is,
rS¯C
n
−
S¯C
nfC
=
rS¯D
n
, (2)
which indicates that the cooperators tend to choose a larger project than the
defectors. Consider a typical case S¯C = S¯D + ε, we obtain
rS¯C
n
−
S¯C
nfC
=
r(S¯C − ε)
n
. (3)
The relationship between the frequencies of cooperators and the scales of the
projects selected by the cooperators becomes
fC =
S¯C
rε
. (4)
The above equation indicates that, for a given r, the frequencies of coop-
erators are related to the scales of the projects selected by the cooperators
and the difference between the scales of the projects selected by the cooper-
ators and the defectors. The larger the scale of projects SC , the larger the
frequency of cooperators fC . The smaller the difference between SC and SD,
the larger the frequency of cooperators fC . Such results are in accordance
with the simulation results in fig. 3 and fig. 5 (a) and (b).
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5. Summary
By incorporating project selection mechanism into the threshold public
goods game, we have investigated the coupling effects of mutation and im-
itation on the evolution of cooperation. As there are more mutants than
imitators in the population, the evolution of cooperation is governed by the
mutation process, which leads to the suppression of cooperation. As there are
more imitators than mutants, the evolution of cooperation is governed by the
coupling of the mutation process and the imitation process, which leads to
the widespread of cooperation. The suppression or promotion of cooperation
in the present model is related to the coevolution of individual strategies and
individual preferences. The widespread of cooperation makes the individuals
selecting a large project earn more, which attracts more individuals to select
large projects and the average value of the scales of the projects selected
by the mutants and the imitators increases. An increase in the scales of
the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators makes the individu-
als with cooperation strategy earn more, which attracts more individuals to
adopt cooperation strategy and the frequency of cooperation increases. The
low level of cooperation makes the individuals selecting a small project earn
a positive return, which attracts more individuals to select small projects and
the average value of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and
the imitators decreases. A decrease in the scales of the projects selected by
the mutants and the imitators makes the individuals with defection strategy
earn more, which attracts more individuals to adopt defection strategy and
the frequency of cooperation decreases.
In the present work, we have only investigated the role of project selec-
tion mechanism in the evolution of cooperation for a homogeneous popu-
lation. Whether or not the project selection mechanism is beneficial for a
heterogeneous population is another challenging issue that deserves further
investigation.
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